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INTRODUCTION 
When the team of government-funded research scientists 
created what was to become known as the Internet in the 1980s, 
the world saw it as a brilliant new means of communication that 
could survive even a nuclear attack.1  As with the unleashing of 
any new technologies, however, progress was destined to create 
conflict with current laws.  While still in its infancy, the Internet 
cast a dark shadow of infringement that turned the formerly stable 
institution of copyright upside down. 
By 2001, the International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry (IFPI) estimated that there were at least twenty-five 
million illegal music files available on the Internet.2  Record 
companies claim that piracy, largely through the growth of peer-to-
peer services, has caused a massive decline in album shipments.3  
In fact, album sales dropped two-and-a-half percent in 2001 and 
nine percent in 2002.4  The problem has a much wider scope 
outside of America, where the recording industry estimates 
physical piracy, typically defined as the public sale of copied CDs 
and tapes, already causes lost sales of two to four billion dollars 
each year.5  Thus, the availability of digital downloading may be 
the biggest threat to copyright that has ever surfaced, and the 
advent of new technology, without safeguards, will only make the 
situation worse. 
In looking for a global solution, the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) developed two Internet treaties in late 1996.6  
 
1 But see KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE 
STORY BEHIND THE CREATION OF THE INTERNET (1996) (questioning the widely held 
notion that the Internet was originally designed to provide the military with a 
communication device capable of withstanding a nuclear attack). 
2 See EU Ministers Back Internet Copyright, BBC News Online,  http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1269000/1269514.stm (Apr. 9, 2001). 
3 See Lynne Margolis, CD Industry Lacks Formula for Success, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Jan. 2, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0102/p02s01-usgn.html. 
4 See id. 
5 See Brad King, Can the World Be Copyrighted?, Wired News, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50658,00.html (Feb. 26, 2002). 
6 See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty [WCT], Apr. 
12, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, available at 1997 WL 447232; WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty [WPPT], Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. No. 
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To ratify these treaties, the United States and the European Union 
adopted anti-circumvention measures to ensure that technology 
does not destroy copyright.  These legislative measures became 
known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)7 in the 
United States and the “Copyright Directive”8 in the European 
Union.  Despite the creation and signing of agreements on both 
sides of the Atlantic, this legislation may not work in practice 
when trying to harmonize copyright law and stop the mass 
downloading of copyrighted music.  For example, the user-friendly 
and anonymous nature of the Internet and a recent decision by the 
Court of Appeals in Amsterdam9 challenge the agreements’ goals. 
Downloading today goes far beyond the much-weakened 
Napster.  The new programs used for downloading copyrighted 
works, including Kazaa, Grokster, Morpheus, and Gnutella, are 
thriving and pose new challenges for lawmakers, courts, and 
copyright holders.  Specifically, many of them allow the trading of 
copyrighted DVD files in addition to music, and all of them do not 
contain a central server through which files pass.10  In addition, the 
evidence that many artists, including platinum-selling ones, have 
been using the Internet to market themselves and send music to 
fans suggests that the finding of positive uses for online music 
distribution through the new decentralized programs will be very 
different than it was in Napster II.11  Finally, while Napster was 
easy to stop by shutting down its central server,12 the new file-
sharing programs are self-perpetuating, much like a disease; the 
only way to stop them would be to seize every piece of technology 
containing the programs. 
 
CRNR/DC/95 [hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty], available at 
http://www.wipo.org/eng/diplconf/distrib/95dc.htm. 
7 Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA], Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 4001 (2000)). 
8 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10–19 [hereinafter Copyright 
Directive]. 
9 See infra Part II.B. 
10 See infra Part II.C. 
11 A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Napster II]. 
12 See infra Part II.C. 
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The purpose of this Note is to examine the international 
struggle of protecting copyright in the digital age and analyze legal 
efforts in the United States and the European Union.  This Note 
takes the position that the United States’ and the European Union’s 
measures are not appropriate or effective enough to combat 
international use of the new decentralized peer-to-peer services for 
downloading copyrighted works.  In addition, this Note 
emphasizes that the threat of digital copyright infringement is truly 
global and requires an international effort to build protection for 
authors.  Such effort must ensure that the public’s interests are 
considered when the international community enacts legislation 
affecting the public’s right to make socially important uses of 
copyrighted works. 
Part I of this Note provides a background of how copyright 
functions in the digital age and discusses recent international 
attempts to protect copyrights, including the WIPO Internet 
treaties.  Part II examines how the United States and European 
Union plans for implementation of the WIPO Internet treaties 
conflict with current legal interpretation, the history of copyright as 
applied, and the changing nature of technology.  Finally, Part III 
sets forth solutions for balancing law and policy goals when trying 
to draw the boundaries between infringement and fair use.  Given 
that it is unlikely that digital infringement will ever cease entirely, 
lawmakers should abandon such an impossible goal and instead 
focus on designing copyright laws that best “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts,”13 by encouraging creativity, 
knowledge, and advancements in digital technology. 
I. HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. Infringement of the Exclusive Rights Under Copyright 
The term “copyright” actually refers to a bundle of exclusive 
rights retained by the author or owner of the copyright.14  Although 
copyright covers a large range of exclusive rights, those that have 
 
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
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been implicated in the Internet music debate are the right of 
reproduction, the right of distribution, and the right of public 
performance.15  The distribution right guarantees the copyright 
owner the right “to distribute copies or phonorecords . . . to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending . . . .”16  Thus, the copyright owner has the right to prohibit 
others from distributing the work—a sale is not required if there is 
a transfer of a tangible copy to the public—until she parts with 
ownership.17  This right, however, is generally limited by the “first 
sale doctrine,” which allows the purchaser of the physical object 
embodying the copyrighted work to treat the thing as her own.18  
For example, a person who buys a book from a store may sell it to 
a second-hand bookstore without permission of the author.  
Although under the first sale doctrine the new owner may sell the 
work or copy to someone else, that does not give her permission to 
make copies of the work.  Therefore, a person who buys a CD may 
give it to her friend or sell it to a used CD store, but this does not 
give her permission to make a copy for her own collection and then 
give the CD to her friend.  In addition, the Copyright Act19 and the 
European Union’s “Software Directive”20 each contain an 
exception to the first sale doctrine, forbidding the commercial 
rental, lease, or lending, or any act “in the nature of rental, lease, or 
lending,” of phonorecords and computer programs.21 
The right of reproduction allows the copyright owner to 
prevent all others from reproducing the work in the form of a copy 
or phonorecord.22  There is an exception to this right under both 
the Copyright Act and the Copyright Directive for temporary 
recordings, but only in the case of broadcast organizations that are 
 
15 See id. § 106(1), (3)–(4).  The right of public performance is also known as the “right 
of communication to the public” in the WIPO treaties. See WCT, supra note 6. 
16 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
17 See id. 
18 See id. § 109. 
19 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–914. 
20 Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) [hereinafter Software Directive]. 
21 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1). See also Software Directive, supra note 20; Council Directive 
92/100/EC, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (harmonizing the EU countries’ first sale doctrines). 
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).  A “copy” is defined as a “material object from which, either 
with the naked eye or other senses, or with the aid of a machine or other device, the work 
can be perceived, reproduced or communicated.” Id. § 101. 
LACKMAN FORMAT.DOC 4/27/16  12:26 PM 
1166 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1161 
recording works for later transmission.23  The Copyright Act 
requires that the user destroy the permitted copy within a certain 
amount of time,24 except for archival purposes.25 
The right of performance or communication to the public 
allows the copyright owner to prevent all others from publicly 
performing the work.26  This right includes a prohibition on 
unauthorized broadcasting or “webcasting” without the copyright 
holder’s permission.27  In addition to composers, who already had 
a right of public performance under the copyright laws, owners of 
copyrights to sound recordings28 also received a public 
performance right in the United States under the Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRA).29 
Infringement occurs whenever a third party exercises one of 
the rights that the copyright holder exclusively retains,30 and the 
infringer is liable whether there was intent or not.31  It has also 
been established in the United States that a conduit for copyright 
infringement may be liable for contributory and vicarious 
infringement,32 except in cases that fall under the safe harbor 
provision of section 512 of the DMCA.33  No member state in the 
European Union has explicitly specified the extent of any vicarious 
 
23 See id. § 111(b)–(c); Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 5(1). 
24 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(b)–(c). 
25 See id. § 117(a)(2). 
26 See id. § 106(4), (6). 
27 See id. § 106(6).  Webcasting is generally defined as the transmission of sounds over 
the Internet, much like how music is transmitted over the airwaves from radio stations to 
radio receivers. See Webcast, SearchNetworking.com, at http://searchnetworking. 
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid7_gci213344,00.html (last visited May 10, 2003) (“The 
term ‘Webcasting’ is used to describe the ability to use the Web to deliver live or delayed 
versions of sound or video broadcasts.”). 
28 A sound recording is distinct from the song itself.  Generally, if a record company 
hires a composer to write a song, the composer retains the right to the underlying 
composition, while the record label retains the rights to the recording of the song as 
performed by an artist under contract with the label. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 114 (granting 
exclusive rights in sound recordings), with id. § 115 (granting exclusive rights in 
nondramatic musical works). 
29 See id. § 106(6). 
30 See id. § 501; WCT, supra note 6. 
31 See id. § 501; WCT, supra note 6. 
32 See infra Parts I.A, II.A.1. 
33 See 17 U.S.C. § 512; infra Part II.A.1. 
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liability, although the concept is mentioned in the Copyright 
Directive.34 
The best-known case concerning copyright infringement of 
digital music illustrates how courts have applied principles of 
copyright to infringement in the digital age.  In Napster II,35 
several record labels sued Napster and its affiliates for direct, 
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement after the 
company provided free software (called “MusicShare”) to the 
public allowing “peer-to-peer” file sharing over the Internet.36  The 
software allowed a user to make exact copies of digital music files 
from one computer and transfer them through Napster’s server 
onto the user’s own computer.37  To prove direct infringement, the 
record companies had to show that Napster violated one of the 
exclusive rights reserved to copyright owners.38  The Ninth Circuit 
held that Napster users, but not Napster itself, had directly 
infringed distribution rights, by uploading file names to the search 
index for others to copy, and reproduction rights, by downloading 
the copyrighted music files.39 
After the court concluded there was direct infringement by the 
users, the court then proceeded to the question of whether Napster 
was contributorily or vicariously liable.40  The court held that 
Napster itself was likely to be found liable for contributory 
infringement because it knew or had reason to know of direct 
infringement of the record labels’ copyrights.41  In addition, the 
court found that Napster “materially contribute[d] to the infringing 
activity” because without the software and support it provided, the 
users could not download the music they wanted.42  Finally, it held 
that Napster was likely to be found liable for vicarious 
infringement because it had “the right and ability to supervise the 
 
34 See Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 8. 
35 A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
36 See id. at 1011. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. at 1013. 
39 See id. at 1014. 
40 See id.  Contributory and vicarious liability have separate elements from direct 
liability. See supra Part II.C.2. 
41 See id. at 1021. 
42 Id. at 1022. 
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infringing activity” and also had “a direct financial interest in such 
activities.”43  The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the financial 
benefit did not have to be immediate, noting that: “[f]inancial 
benefit exists where the availability of infringing material ‘acts as a 
draw for customers.’”44 
Although the ruling appeared very broad, the Ninth Circuit 
tempered it by limiting the scope of liability and placing the 
burden on the plaintiffs to protect their works: 
[C]ontributory liability may potentially only be imposed to 
the extent that Napster: (1) receives reasonable knowledge 
of specific infringing files with copyrighted musical 
compositions and sound recordings; (2) knows or should 
know that such files are available on the Napster system; 
and (3) fails to act to prevent viral distribution of the 
works.45 
The court then required the record labels to “provide notice to 
Napster of copyrighted works and files containing such works 
available on the Napster system before Napster ha[d] the duty to 
disable access to the offending content.  Napster, however, also 
b[ore] the burden of policing the system within the limits of the 
system.”46  In the end, the court granted the injunction against 
Napster.47 
B. International Copyright Protection Before Napster 
Global copyright protection’s roots are in the 1886 Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(hereinafter “Berne Convention”).48  The Berne Convention set 
minimum standards for copyright protection and included an 
allowance for enforcement procedures, although national law could 
 
43 Id. 
44 See id. at 1023. 
45 Id. at 1027. 
46 Id.  These caveats may become loopholes for future peer-to-peer defendants. See 
infra Part II.C.2. 
47 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1028. 
48 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (amended 1979) [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]. 
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create greater protection if a signatory state so desired.49  One of 
the major goals of the Berne Convention was to “protect, in as 
effective and uniform manner as possible, the rights of authors in 
their literary and artistic works,” regardless of the nationality of the 
author.50  The treaty, however, was not without its faults: it did not 
protect owners of sound recordings, nor did it create any global 
system of enforcement of copyright laws against infringement.51  
Illustrative of the problem with harmonization through 
international treaties, the United States did not join the Berne 
Convention until 1988, over a century after its enactment.52  In 
addition, because enforcement is left to the signatory states, there 
is no remedy under the Berne Convention when a state lags in 
pursuing those who infringe copyrights.53 
Dissatisfied with the protection under the Berne Convention, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has approximately 
140 members, brought intellectual property into trade regulation 
during the 1986–1994 GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.54  The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) attempted to fill the gaps left by other treaties and 
apply the Berne Convention standards to the WTO states gradually 
from 2000 to 2006.55  Like the Berne Convention, however, TRIPS 
is not self-executing, and each state must establish its own means 
of enforcement.56 
In response to the “profound impact” the Internet was having 
on literary and artistic works, and because the Berne Convention 
 
49 See Liz Robinson, Comment, Music on the Internet: An International Copyright 
Dilemma, 23 HAWAII L. REV. 183, 190 (2000). 
50 See Berne Convention, supra note 48, arts. 5–6. 
51 See Linda W. Tai, Music Piracy in the Pacific Rim: Applying a Regional Approach 
Towards the Enforcement Problem of International Conventions, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 
159, 170 (1995). 
52 See Robinson, supra note 49, at 190. 
53 See id. 
54 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 22 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
55 See Robinson, supra note 49, at 197–98. 
56 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 54, art. 14(2). 
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had not been updated since 1971,57 the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), which has 175 member states, sought a 
solution. On December 20, 1996, it adopted the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT).58  The WCT and WPPT expanded previous 
standards for copyright to cover digital works.59  They both 
specifically address and affirm the exclusive rights of distribution, 
reproduction, and communication to the public of authors’, 
performers’, and record companies’ works, including the right to 
make “works available in a way that the public can access them at 
a time and place of [the owners’] own choosing, which is the 
typical paradigm of transmissions over the Internet.”60  The WIPO 
treaties also specifically require all those who ratify them to 
implement regulations and remedies against “the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors 
[including performers or producers of phonograms] in connection 
with the exercise of their rights” under the WIPO treaties.61 
These WIPO Internet treaties set the background and together 
are the basis for the United States’ DMCA and the European 
Union’s Copyright Directive.  For example, the United States, 
already having an exclusive right of communication to the public 
contained in a myriad of laws, focused on the anti-circumvention 
aspect of the treaties when creating the DMCA.62  The European 
Union, on the other hand, addressed both the digital rights and 
anti-circumvention in its Copyright Directive.63  Perhaps the 
 
57 See Jesse Feder, Symposium: Keynote Address, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 265, 268 (2001). 
58 See WCT, supra note 6; WPPT, supra note 6.  These treaties are often referred to 
collectively as the WIPO “Internet treaties.” See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The 
Internationalization of Intellectual Property: New Challenges from the Very Old and the 
Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 931 (2002). 
59 See WCT, supra note 6, art. 1(4); WPPT, supra note 6, art. 18. 
60 Feder, supra note 57, at 268–69. 
61 WCT, supra note 6, art. 11 (providing that “Contracting Parties shall provide 
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise 
of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect 
of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law”). 
See also WPPT, supra note 6, art. 18. 
62 See Feder, supra note 57, at 269. 
63 See id. 
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United States and the European Union jumped in too quickly, 
however, as neither the WCT nor the WPPT will go into effect 
until it is ratified by thirty member states.64  Only about nineteen 
member states currently have done so.65 
II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN NEW LEGISLATION AND HISTORICAL 
INTERPRETATION 
A.  Implementation of the WIPO Treaties 
1. The United States and the DMCA 
To comply with the WIPO treaties, the United States passed 
the DMCA in 1998.66  In fact, Title I of the DMCA specifically 
implements the two WIPO Internet treaties.67  The main focus of 
the DMCA is split into two parts: Section 120168 prohibits the 
circumvention of copyright protections, and section 51269 provides 
a safe harbor for online service and Internet service providers (ISP) 
who are accused of contributory or vicarious infringement when 
their subscribers infringe copyrights.70  Only the former section 
was required by WIPO; the latter was the result of a bargain made 
with ISPs to ensure that the measure would pass more easily in 
Congress.71 
 
64 See id. at 268. 
65 See id. 
66 DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2000)). 
67 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
68 Id. § 1201. 
69 Id. § 512. 
70 See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 99-CV-2070, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1889, at *17–*18 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (“The DMCA prohibits the manufacture, 
import, offer to the public, or trafficking in any technology, product, service, device, 
component, or part thereof that: (1) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of 
circumventing a technological measure that effectively ‘controls access to’ a copyrighted 
work or ‘protects a right of a copyright owner;’ (2) has only limited commercially 
significant purpose or use other than to [circumvent] such technological protection 
measures; or (3) is marketed for use in circumventing such technological protection 
measures”). 
71 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 135 (2001); cf. In re Verizon Internet 
Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 37 (D.D.C. Jan. 2003) (“Congress . . . created trade-offs 
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Section 1201, while initially thought of as an anti-infringement 
statute, is actually separate from the Copyright Act’s definition of 
copyright infringement.72  It instead focuses on methods created to 
circumvent technological protections on copyrighted works.73  In 
RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., the defendant was charged 
with infringement and violation of the DMCA’s section 1201 
because it manufactured programs that would bypass the plaintiff’s 
protection measures and access the files on the plaintiff’s server, 
allowing the user to make unauthorized copies of digital music 
files and convert those files into various formats.74  Without 
Streambox’s software, users could not bypass the protected files 
and get music on such a grand scale.75  The court held that two of 
the programs, the “Streambox VCR” and the “Ferret” violated the 
DMCA, but the “Ripper” did not.76  The court found that the 
Streambox VCR was designed primarily to circumvent 
RealNetworks’ access control and copy protection measures,77 and 
that the Ferret created a derivative work by modifying the 
plaintiff’s program.78  Thus, they both directly infringed the 
copyright.79 
 
within the DMCA: service providers would receive liability protections in exchange for 
assisting copyright owners in identifying and dealing with infringers who misuse the 
service providers’ systems.  At the same time, copyright owners would forgo pursuing 
service providers for the copyright infringement of their users, in exchange for the 
assistance in identifying and acting against those infringers.”). 
72 See RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *17. 
73 See id. (“RealNetworks’ claims against the Streambox VCR and the Ripper . . . arise 
under section 1201 of the DMCA, and thus do not constitute copyright ‘infringement’ 
claims.”); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
12.A18[B], at 12A–185 (2002) (noting that section 1201 of the DMCA occupies “a niche 
distinct from copyright infringement”). 
74 See RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *10–*11. 
75 See id. at *19. 
76 Id. at *3.  The “Streambox VCR” would imitate RealNetworks’s “secret handshake” 
so RealNetworks’s program would think the user of the Streambox VCR was authorized 
to download and copy files. See id. at *11–*13.  This worked much like a cable television 
box that would unscramble signals for which the user had not paid. See id.  The “Ripper” 
allowed a user to convert a file from one format to another. See id.  The “Ferret,” when 
installed as a “plug-in” to a user’s computer, altered the visual appearance and operation 
of RealNetworks’s interface. See id. 
77 See id. at *21. 
78 See id. at *31. 
79 See id. 
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Conversely, the court dismissed the claim on the Ripper 
because the format that the Ripper converted was not a 
preventative “technological measure,” and the Ripper had 
“legitimate and commercially significant uses.”80  This illustrates a 
form of exclusivity between violations of the DMCA and 
copyright infringement.  Because the Ripper was not an anti-
circumvention measure and thus did not violate the DMCA, it went 
through a fair use analysis similar to the one in Sony Corp.  v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.81  This analysis was used to determine 
whether the creators of the program were liable for contributory or 
vicarious infringement, as in Napster II.82  Since RealNetworks 
defines steps for the analysis of mixed infringement/anti-
circumvention claims, it could be instrumental in predicting how 
courts will examine such claims in the future. 
Before the issues on copyright infringement were addressed in 
the Napster II case, Napster first tried to invoke the DMCA’s safe 
harbor provision under section 512 to avoid monetary damages and 
injunctive relief in Napster I.83  Napster argued that it should be 
considered an ISP under Section 512(a), and enjoy limited liability 
for copyright infringement resulting from the transmission of files 
through its network.84  The court evaluated the five conditions to 
be satisfied for such a finding: 
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or at 
the direction of a person other than the service provider; (2) 
the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or 
storage is carried out through an automatic technical 
process without selection of the material by the service 
provider; (3) the service provider does not select the 
recipients of the material except as an automatic response 
to the request of another person; (4) no copy of the material 
made by the service provider in the course of such 
intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the 
 
80 Id. at *28, *30. 
81 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see also infra Part II.C. 
82 239 F.3d 1004, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
83 A&M Records v. Napster, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
[hereinafter Napster I], aff’d 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
84 See id. 
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system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such 
anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably 
necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of 
connections; and (5) the material is transmitted through the 
system or network without modification of its content.85 
 
After analyzing the elements, the court found that Napster was 
not a “service provider” as defined by section 512(a) because it did 
not “transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly 
infringing material through its system.”86  Most importantly, 
Napster did not implement a policy of termination for subscribers 
who were repeat infringers under section 512(i).87  The court 
explained that Napster had to satisfy this subsection to enjoy any 
protection under section 512, but found that it did not comply, 
despite its ability to terminate such users.  Napster, therefore, could 
not invoke the safe harbor provisions at all.88 
This would seem a strong victory for the record industry, if 
only to completely eliminate accused infringers’ use of the 
argument that their status as ISPs exempts them from section 512. 
While everyone was watching Napster, however, dozens of clones 
sprouted up—ones with better, harder-to-trace systems that had no 
central server to attack.89  Most programs in use now are built on 
“distributed networks,” through which computers search other 
computers’ files, without having to use a central index.90  Because 
these networks are distributed, and not centralized, it is nearly 
impossible either to shut them down or find the alleged infringers 
to sue.91  If found and brought to court, the creators of the 
networks would undoubtedly distinguish themselves from Napster 
I, arguing that once the software is distributed, its usage can no 
longer be controlled and the infringers cannot be removed from the 
 
85 Id. at *9–*10. 
86 Id. at *25. 
87 See id. at *29–*30. 
88 See id. 
89 See Charles C. Mann, The Year the Music Dies, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 92. 
90 See Douglas Wolk, Rough Trade, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 26, 2002, at 36.  These 
decentralized programs include Kazaa, Limewire, Gnutella, Morpheus, and Grokster. Id. 
91 See id. 
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system.92  They could then try to define themselves as ISPs under 
section 512 and “do their best” to help the record industry stop 
infringement, even though the services’ “best” may amount to 
doing nothing.93  Although this argument could be successful on 
technical grounds, peer-to-peer services are unlikely to pass the 
first hurdle that Napster failed: the requirement for the service to 
“transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly infringing 
material through its system.”94  The courts reviewing future cases 
involving other programs would likely never get to the secondary 
issue of user termination.95 
Despite the new programs’ lack of control, the DMCA test 
under section 1201, as illustrated in RealNetworks, will probably 
not bend an inch for the creators of any programs found to 
circumvent copyright security measures.  Nevertheless, 
RealNetworks is distinguishable from the case where a program 
allows sharing of compressed music files.  Whereas RealNetworks 
had set up security measures against unauthorized access or 
copying, it can be argued that record companies have failed to set 
up security measures of their own.  Therefore, a file-sharing 
program such as Kazaa, which is one of the peer-to-peer programs 
built on a distributed network,96 cannot be found to be 
circumventing any “technological measure” and would thus not be 
liable under section 1201 of the DMCA.97  This finding would 
bring the program back under the similar test formulated by the 
RealNetworks court for the Ripper to assess the program’s 
capability for substantial noninfringing uses.98  As will be 
 
92 See Dutch Court Clears Web Music Swapping, MSN Tech & Gadgets, at 
http://msn.com.com/2100-1105-870551.html (Mar. 28, 2002) (explaining a Dutch 
appellate court decision overturning a finding of Kazaa’s liability for copyright 
infringement, “saying Kazaa is not responsible for the illegal actions of people using its 
software”). 
93 Napster I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6243, at *29–*30; see also infra Part II.C.2 
(providing a more in-depth discussion of peer-to-peer program creators’ inability to 
monitor infringement). 
94 Id. at *29–*30. 
95 See id. 
96 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
97 See RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1889, at *28 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000). 
98 See id. 
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discussed in Part II.C., however, courts in general have not 
followed the “substantial noninfringing use” test for file-swapping 
programs, as the sheer volume of copyright infringements on the 
Internet has caused some courts to focus more on making the 
problem go away at the expense of the public’s fair use rights. 
2. The European Union’s Response 
In June of 2001, the European Parliament and the Council 
passed the Copyright Directive on the “harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society.”99  Like the DMCA, the Copyright Directive was intended 
to enable the European Union and its member states to ratify the 
WCT and WPPT.100  The Copyright Directive was also intended to 
bring Europe’s copyright laws up to speed with technological 
advances, including Internet file swapping.101  The member states 
had until December 22, 2002, to ratify and implement the new 
law.102  Only a handful of states, however, have begun the process 
and only Greece has actually enacted legislation that follows the 
Copyright Directive.103  The states that intend to ratify the law are 
still proceeding in their efforts under pressure from the European 
Union.104 
On the occasion of its enactment, Frits Bolkestein, Internal 
Market Commissioner of the European Parliament, emphasized the 
Copyright Directive’s importance, stating that “[n]ot only is this 
Directive the most important measure ever to be adopted by 
Europe in the copyright field but it brings European copyright rules 
into the digital age.”105  The Copyright Directive attempts to 
prohibit the swapping of copyrighted files and harmonize 
 
99 Copyright Directive, supra note 8. 
100 See id. 
101 See id. 
102 See Europe Approves Copyright Law, Wired News, at http://www.wired.com/ 
news/politics/0,1283,42934,00.html (Apr. 9, 2001). 
103 See Copyright Directive—Implementation Running Late, STM Copyright News, at 
http://www.stm-assoc.org/committees/copynews.html (Jan./Feb. 2003). 
104 See id. 
105 The European Commission, Commission Welcomes Adoption of the Directive on 
Copyright in the Information Society by the Council, Intellectual Property: News, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/intprop/news/copyright.htm (Apr. 9, 2001). 
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reproduction, distribution, and public communications rights.106  In 
contrast to the DMCA, which does not need to list the exceptions 
for copyright infringement liability because these exceptions are 
well-established by statute and case law,107 the Copyright Directive 
sets forth a list of exceptions that are exhaustive—a member state 
may apply any or all of the exceptions, but no others (except in 
cases of analog use).108  For example, the Copyright Directive 
specifically notes exemptions from liability for making temporary 
copies and for certain nonprofit organizations.109 
Moreover, unlike the DMCA, the Copyright Directive does not 
provide broad insulation from liability for ISPs.  At least one case 
in the European Union, LICRA v. Yahoo!, held that ISPs may be 
found liable for hosting certain illegal content or activities.110  This 
ruling sharply contrasts section 512 of the DMCA and was not 
enforced in the United States due to First Amendment concerns.111  
A similar verdict in Germany clashes on all points with section 512 
of the DMCA.112  In a suit filed in 1997 against America Online 
(AOL), a German court ruled that AOL was liable for permitting 
its subscribers to trade copyrighted files online.113 
Despite these few minor differences, the Copyright Directive is 
very similar to the DMCA.  Like the DMCA’s section 1201, anti-
circumvention measures under article 6 of the Copyright Directive 
remain within the control of copyright holders.114  Only those with 
copyrights may allow their works to be reproduced, distributed, 
and communicated to the public.115  In line with the U.S. first sale 
doctrine, the Copyright Directive states that the copyright holder’s 
 
106 See id. 
107 See infra Part II.B (regarding the fair use doctrine and its applications in the United 
States). 
108 See infra Part II.B. 
109 See Copyright Directive, supra note 8. 
110 See La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme [LICRA] v. Yahoo!, TGI Paris, 
Interim Order No. 00/05308, Nov. 20, 2001, http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/ 
001120yahoofrance.pdf. 
111 See Yahoo! v. LICRA, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
112 See Patricia Jacobus, AOL Found Guilty of Allowing Music Bootlegs, CNET 
News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-239175.html (Apr. 12, 2000). 
113 See id. 
114 See Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 6. 
115 See id. 
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distribution right is exhausted within the European Union once the 
holder markets the work in the European Union (but that does not 
mean that the holder has exhausted the right outside the European 
Union).116  The EU Software Directive, like 17 U.S.C. § 109 in the 
United States, makes an exception to first sale for digital 
distribution, advising that every distribution online should be 
authorized where the copyright so provides.117  If a similar first 
sale exception were applied to book sales, one would have to call 
up the author and ask permission to sell the book to a used 
bookstore.  Remedies under the Software Directive are severe and 
include the possibility of injunction, monetary damages, and 
seizure of material and equipment, whether or not the person or 
entity has actually infringed a copyright.118 
Thus, using a similar approach to that of the United States, the 
EU Copyright Directive aims to update copyright protection in the 
wake of new peer-to-peer sharing and protect against the 
manufacture, distribution, and sale of any technological measures 
used to circumvent any restrictions placed by the copyright 
holder.119  In comparing it to the United States’ approach, the 
Copyright Directive can be best analogized to the DMCA, in 
which a copyright holder must have some technological measure in 
place before the creator or user of a circumvention program can be 
held liable under article 6.120  In cases not involving anti-
circumvention devices, courts in the European Union, possibly in 
the interest of international harmonization, will likely rely on 
analysis similar to Napster II.  In other words, instead of stretching 
the Copyright Directive to fit non-anti-circumvention devices, the 
EU courts may use similar reasoning to U.S. courts to find liability 
over the new peer-to-peer services. 
 
116 See id. 
117 See Software Directive, supra note 20, recitals 28–29. 
118 See Software Directive, supra note 20, art. 8. 
119 See Richard Menta, Europe Passes “Napster” Law, MP3 Newswire, at 
http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/eu.html (Feb. 14, 2001). 
120 Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 6.  The Copyright Directive, however, makes 
no mention of notice required on behalf of copyright holders to be given to a person or 
entity accused of contributory or vicarious infringement. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2000) 
(outlining the DMCA’s notification provision). 
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B. Fair Use: A Defense to Copyright Infringement at Home but 
Not Abroad 
The most common defense to copyright infringement is fair 
use.  The nature of fair use usually involves weighing policies on a 
case-by-case basis.  In the United States, under section 107 of the 
Copyright Act, four public interests are identified: (1) the purpose 
and character of the use, including its commercial nature; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the proportion that was 
“taken”; and (4) the economic impact of the “taking.”121  No single 
element is decisive, but the first, the purpose and character of the 
use, and the fourth, the economic impact of the taking, are 
generally the most influential.122  While much of the U.S. 
exemptions for fair use developed through case law, the EU 
Copyright Directive specifically allows fair use in teaching, 
scientific research, and social commentary.123  It also advises that 
the exceptions and limitations the member states provide “duly 
reflect the increased economic impact that such exceptions or 
limitations may have in the context of the new electronic 
environment.”124  The DMCA, however, provides very few 
exceptions for liability when a protective measure is circumvented.  
Unlike case law that has recognized the legitimacy of making 
copies for personal use and individual teaching, the DMCA 
permits the use of circumvention tools only for nonprofit libraries, 
archives, educational institutions,125 law enforcement agencies, and 
very limited reverse engineering research.126  It is worth noting, 
 
121 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
122 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–51 (1984) 
(considering the first and fourth fair use elements to be dispositive). 
123 See Copyright Directive, supra note 8. 
124 Id. recital 44; see also id. art. 5 (setting forth the exceptions and limitations). 
125 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d).  An extra limitation is placed on this exception for these 
three groups: They may access the work “solely in order to make a good faith 
determination of whether to acquire a copy,” and only if  “an identical copy of that work 
is not reasonably available in another form.” Id. 
126 See id. § 1201(d)–(f).  The ban on circumvention of protection applies even when a 
later use of the work (and the reason for circumventing the protection) would be legal 
under doctrines of fair use. See Jason Young, Digital Copyright Reform in Canada: 
Reflections on WIPO and the DMCA, Apr. 26, 2002, available at 
http://www.lexinformatica.org/dox/digitalcopyright.pdf.  For example, a professor is 
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however, that for qualified parties to get the tools to circumvent the 
protection, some other party would likely have to be the creator, 
and this nonexempt creator of the circumvention measures would 
then be liable under the DMCA.127 
The major case relied on by defendants in music downloading 
suits is Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,128 in which 
television companies accused the manufacturer of home video tape 
recorders of contributory infringement.  The Supreme Court, in 
applying the fair use factors, held that (1) the public should not be 
prohibited from taping educational, religious, or other programs 
authorized to be taped by the copyright holders for noncommercial 
use; (2) there was no likelihood of harm to the market shown; and 
(3) the tape recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses, 
even though over eighty percent of users’ activity constituted 
actionable infringement.129  Since Sony, however, fair use has 
generally not been a successful argument in digital downloading 
cases, most likely due to the allegedly wide economic impact of 
displacing sales of music with free downloaded tracks.130 
While it would appear that the European Union intended to 
follow the U.S. implementation of the WIPO treaties with the EU 
Copyright Directive, and therefore reach similar results in 
copyright cases as U.S. courts, a member state recently called the 
attempt at European and global copyright harmonization into 
question.  On November 29, 2001, the Amsterdam District Court 
held that the creators of Kazaa, a peer-to-peer file-sharing program 
that has been downloaded more than 223 million times,131 were 
liable for copyright infringement and had to take measures to 
 
liable under the DMCA if he or she breaks protection on a DVD to copy it only for the 
fair use purpose of showing a scene from the movie in class. See id. 
127 See id.  It makes sense to think that libraries will look to a third party to develop the 
complicated software to break the protective codes on copyrighted works. 
128 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  The infringement that the defendants were allegedly 
contributing to was the home taping of copyrighted television programs and movies. See 
id. at 420. 
129 See id. at 456. 
130 See, e.g., Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
131 See http://www.kazaa.com (last visited May 11, 2003). 
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terminate the infringements.132  On March 28, 2002, however, the  
Amsterdam Court of Appeal reversed the ruling.133  The Court of 
Appeal’s decision embraced fair use principles, noting that 
Kazaa’s computer program is not exclusively used for 
downloading copyrighted works.134  Instead of focusing on the 
imposition of contributory or vicarious liability on the defendants, 
the Court of Appeal placed the primary responsibility in the 
individual users’ hands, explaining that, like Sony’s production of 
the VCR, “[p]roviding the means for publication or reproduction of 
copyright protected works is not an act of publication or 
reproduction in its own right.”135  Perhaps most significantly, the 
Court of Appeal emphasized that it was impossible for Kazaa to 
monitor users’ file sharing and therefore impossible to “incorporate 
a blockage against the unlawful exchange of files,” even if it 
received notice from the copyright holders.136  Thus, while the 
Napster decisions have eroded the principles of Sony in the United 
States, there is at least one court in Europe trying to revive fair use 
and protection for new technologies as they existed under Sony. 
The Kazaa decision was the first to protect a file-sharing 
company against copyright liability, but it is unclear whether this is 
an influential trend that could threaten the goal of harmonization or 
 
132 See Noot bij Kazaa/Buma-Stemra, Hof, Amsterdam, 28 maart 2002, rolnr. 1370/01 
(ann. SKG), unofficial translation available at http://www.steptoe.com/webdoc.nsf/Files/ 
196e/$file/196e.pdf [hereinafter Kazaa]. 
133 See id. 
134 See id.  The court relied on an expert report submitted by Kazaa: 
  Is KaZaA exclusively suited for the exchange of music files?  Absolutely 
not.  KaZaA is particularly well suited for certain types of files containing 
metadata and it is user-friendly.  This does include MP3, a popular format for 
the exchange of music.  However, KaZaA is also used for the exchange of 
Microsoft Word files.  Furthermore, apart from the exchange of music, the 
exchange of jokes is also very popular among KaZaA users. 
 KaZaA is very well suited as a communication tool for communities that are 
autonomous, that do not want to make use of a central service but that still have 
to exchange files. Examples would be: 
• Freelance photographers 
• Real estate agents 
• Citizens who want to publish things. 
Id. ¶ 4.4 (quoting Dr. E. Huizer’s expert report). 
135 Id. ¶ 4.9. 
136 Id. ¶ 4.4 (quoting Dr. E. Huizer’s expert report). 
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a mere anomaly.137  “[The Kazaa decision] doesn’t bind American 
courts, but it could weaken the overall structure of international 
copyright law if other countries begin offering safe havens to 
companies,” said Bruce Lehman, who helped develop a substantial 
portion of the DMCA.138  The decision may also conflict with the 
goals of the WIPO treaties and the EU Copyright Directive, which 
suggests that the member states may not be implementing the laws 
as seriously as intended and will have a difficult time doing so.139  
While piracy havens abound throughout the world, a haven in the 
Netherlands could isolate American interests in copyright from the 
European Union in practice, and not just in theory.140  Kazaa is 
also being sued in the United States, which is not bound by the 
Dutch precedent; the Netherlands decision could influence 
domestic courts’ analysis, however, in a bid for harmonization.141 
On the other hand, the Kazaa ruling can be viewed not as the 
result of an erratic court, but as a statement that fits squarely within 
RealNetworks and Sony.  If the Court of Appeal had followed 
analysis analogous to the RealNetworks court (in its application of 
the DMCA) and considered the Copyright Directive, it would have 
found that Kazaa was not an anti-circumvention measure and thus 
not liable under article 6 of the Copyright Directive.142  Just as the 
U.S. courts did in Sony and RealNetworks, the Dutch court applied 
the contributory infringement test and found other substantial legal 
and noninfringing uses for the Kazaa program, such as sharing 
personal photo albums too large to be sent by e-mail or songs that 
the owner has given permission to distribute.143  This is not to say 
 
137 See John Borland, Ruling Bolsters File-Traders’ Prospects, CNET News.com, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-870396.html (Mar. 28, 2002). 
138 See Brad King, The Kazaa Ruling: What It Means, Wired News, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51457,00.html (Apr. 2, 2002). 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See Borland, supra note 137. 
142 See Copyright Directive, supra note 8, art. 6. 
143 See Kazaa ¶ 4.9; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 446 
(1984). 
If there are millions of owners of [VCRs] who make copies of televised sports 
events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs such as Mister Rogers’ 
Neighborhood, and if the proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, 
the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible 
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that Kazaa is consistent with U.S. law, however; it is directly at 
odds with Napster II, which held that there would be liability if the 
makers of the program knew about and materially contributed to 
infringing activity, or if they had an interest in the infringing 
activity and did nothing to stop it.144  Under the test used in 
Napster II, the company that created Kazaa might be liable due to 
its knowledge of the program’s wide infringing capabilities and the 
substantial corporate investment and financial returns that the 
company currently enjoys.145  Thus, when the District Court in 
California rules on the case in the United States involving the suit 
against Kazaa,146 it might reach a completely different result from 
the Supreme Court in Sony and the Court of Appeal in the 
Netherlands. 
C. Applying Our Legal Standards to New Technologies 
Since the fall of Napster, the nature of downloading music and 
movies has changed.147  File-sharing programs no longer need a 
Napster-like central server and instead connect individual users 
directly with other users.148  In February 2001, Napster had twenty-
six million users in thirteen different countries; in January 2003, 
Kazaa counted sixty million users around the world, with twenty-
two million in the United States.149 
One of the major problems in suing a company like Kazaa is 
the lack of global copyright harmonization.  With so many 
 
should not be stifled simply because the equipment is used by some individuals 
to make unauthorized  reproductions of respondents’ works. 
Id. 
144 See Napster I, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–24 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
145 See Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 106.  It is worth 
noting that the Sony court did not reach the issue of profit for Sony through sales of the 
VCR because “time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a 
noncommercial, nonprofit activity.” See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449. 
146 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (finding jurisdiction over Sharman Networks, owners of the Kazaa program, and 
consolidating the suit against it with the suits against Grokster and Streamcast).  All three 
programs use the FastTrack software. Id. at 1080. 
147 See Mann, supra note 89. 
148 See id. 
149 See Grace J. Bergen, The Napster Case: The Whole World Is Listening, 15 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 259, 260 (2002); Woody, supra note 145. 
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standards around the world, it is difficult to get jurisdiction in the 
United States or any EU country that may have ratified the 
Copyright Directive when Kazaa can just set up shop somewhere 
else.150  In addition, peer-to-peer services like Kazaa, Morpheus, 
and Gnutella have no central server, which makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the companies to monitor file swapping.151  This 
legally significant difference from the structure of Napster may 
cause the new peer-to-peer services, even if brought under the 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, to fall outside the scope of vicarious 
and contributory infringement liability.  Even though few argued 
that Napster was a direct infringer, the record companies 
succeeded in getting an injunction against Napster under theories 
of contributory and vicarious liability.152  If copyright holders are 
unable to demonstrate contributory or vicarious liability, peer-to-
peer services could meet the Sony fair use test in the same way that 
Kazaa did in the Netherlands. 
In interpreting digital downloading cases, at least in the United 
States, courts have shied away from the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Sony.  Instead of emphasizing the importance of fair 
use and embracing the positive uses of the new technology, they 
have generally ignored fair use and focused almost exclusively on 
the negative uses: “Courts have not allowed the defense that 
infringing uses may have stimulated sales in some instances.  To 
measure harm, courts have considered whether the defendant’s use 
diminishes or prejudices potential sales, interferes with 
marketability, or fulfills the demand for the original.”153  Thus, 
when cases are decided in the United States, it is unlikely that the 
courts will find Kazaa to be more like the Betamax VCR than like 
Napster.154  In cases of digital downloading, therefore, it appears 
that the fair use test is less likely to be used as a test that balances 
 
150 See Woody, supra note 145. 
151 See Jed Scully, Beyond Napster—Is It Just Music? Or Are Judicial Resolutions 
Ineffective in Digital Commerce?, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 313, 318 (2002). 
152 See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001). 
153 See Michael A. Einhorn, Copyright, Prevention, and Rational Governance: File-
Sharing and Napster, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 449, 452 (2001). 
154 See id. 
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public interests, as in Sony,155 than as a basis for finding and 
affirming liability, as in Napster II.156 
The continuing and rampant exchange of copyrighted files on 
the Internet makes it evident that record companies’ lawsuits, no 
matter how favorable the outcomes, have not been very effective in 
deterring creators or users of file-trading software.157  There are 
two primary reasons for this: (1) it can be difficult to get 
jurisdiction over the creators of non-U.S. peer-to-peer companies, 
and (2) once the programs are out on the Internet, it is difficult for 
the creators to stop the use of their programs.158  As these 
weaknesses in legal solutions become more problematic, record 
companies will attempt to fill the gaps by using other nonlegal 
(and possibly illegal), technical solutions to solve the problem of 
file-sharing among individuals. 
1. Jurisdiction 
Before a court can apply the standard of contributory or 
vicarious infringement to new peer-to-peer services that do not 
have a central server, the court must first determine whether such 
services fall under its jurisdiction.  In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios v. Grokster, it was easy to assert jurisdiction over Grokster 
and Streamcast (which developed the program Morpheus) because 
the companies were based in the United States.  However, the U.S. 
District Court in the Central District of California had to analyze 
Sharman Networks, which owns the Kazaa interface, more closely 
to determine whether it conducted enough business in the United 
States to be subject to jurisdiction there.159  Sharman, which owns 
the Kazaa interface, was formed in the small island nation of 
 
155 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) 
(“All reproductions of the work, however, are not within the exclusive domain of the 
copyright owner; some are in the public domain.  Any individual may reproduce a 
copyrighted [work] for a ‘fair use’; the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive 
right to such a use.”). 
156 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014–17. 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 2–12. 
158 See Jerome Kuptz, Gnutella: Unstoppable by Design, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 236 
(providing an excellent diagram of how peer-to-peer services are virtually unstoppable). 
159 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
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Vanuatu and does business primarily in Australia, but runs its 
servers in Denmark and keeps its software in Estonia.160  The 
California court found specific personal jurisdiction: “Sharman 
engages in a significant quantum of commercial contact with 
California residents constituting a but for cause of Plaintiffs’ 
claims.  Jurisdiction is therefore presumptively reasonable.”161  
The court’s personal jurisdiction analysis will likely be influential 
in lawsuits against other non-U.S. peer-to-peer services.  Over the 
past few years, courts have evaluated how traditional notions of 
jurisdiction apply to Internet-based businesses.  Such cases may 
provide guidance as to whether (1) a peer-to-peer provider has 
sufficient “minimum contacts” with the United States, (2) the 
claim asserted against the provider arises out of those contacts, and 
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable.162 
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., a district 
court considered whether an online news service infringed a 
company’s trademark.163  The most significant connection between 
the online service and the forum state arose from its subscription 
service; approximately two percent of its 14,000 subscribers were 
from the state.164  In addition, the online service had entered into 
seven agreements with ISPs in the state to allow subscribers to 
access the news service.165  The court reasoned that 
the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be 
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the 
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 
conducts over the Internet. . . .  If the defendant enters into 
contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that 
involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer 
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. . . .  
A passive Web site that does little more than make 
 
160 See id. at 1080. 
161 Id. at 1088. 
162 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122–23 (W.D. Pa. 
1997). 
163 See id. at 1119. 
164 See id. at 1121. 
165 See id. 
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information available to those who are interested in it is not 
grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction.166 
In unclear cases that occupy the middle ground, “the exercise of 
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity 
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs 
on the Web site.”167 
While the court held that the online service purposely availed 
itself of doing business in the state based on its online transactions 
and contracts with ISPs within the forum,168 a peer-to-peer service 
company could argue that the choice of whether to provide its 
services to residents of the United States is not within its control.  
Once a person downloads a program that does not require a central 
server to transmit search requests or files, anyone around the world 
can download a copy of the program from that user.  This would 
distinguish a peer-to-peer service company from the defendant in 
Zippo, where the court noted that “Dot Com repeatedly and 
consciously chose” to make contact with the forum state.169  Based 
on the recommendations of the Zippo court, however, it might be 
foreseeable that the program could cause commercial harm to 
companies in the United States.170  Thus, services like Kazaa or 
Grokster may have difficulty escaping U.S. jurisdiction no matter 
where they try to hide. 
Other cases would also support a finding of personal 
jurisdiction over peer-to-peer providers based on their effects in 
the United States, possibly conferring jurisdiction over a peer-to-
peer defendant wherever the effects are felt.  In Panavision 
International, L.P. v. Toeppen, the court found personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant partially because the defendant had 
registered the “Panavision” domain name “with the knowledge that 
the names belonged to plaintiff and with the intent to interfere with 
 
166 Id. at 1124. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. at 1125–26. 
169 Id. at 1127. 
170 See id. at 1126–27. 
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[plaintiff’s] business.”171  While companies like Sharman may 
argue that they do not intend to interfere with record companies’ 
business, their success, whether monetary or not,172 has come 
largely in part from their programs’ ability to find and download 
copyrighted works.  Thus, although only one recent case at the trial 
court level is directly on point for peer-to-peer services,173 record 
companies continue to claim that the wild popularity of the 
programs among millions of American users causes them harm.  
Other courts, therefore, may find this harm sufficient in most peer-
to-peer situations to assert the requisite personal jurisdiction to 
bring the programs’ creators and distributors into a U.S. court.174 
2. Supervision and Contributory/Vicarious Liability 
After finding jurisdiction, courts will turn to the Napster II test 
to determine whether the services are liable for contributory or 
vicarious infringement.175  The imposition of liability for 
contributory infringement in Napster II rested on the finding that 
Napster knew or had reason to know of its users’ direct 
infringement.176  Under Sony, Napster may have been absolved 
from the knowledge standard where the program was “capable of 
both infringing and ‘substantial noninfringing uses.’”177 
The Ninth Circuit found that Napster did have potentially 
valuable uses and would not itself impute the requisite level of 
knowledge for contributory liability to Napster.178  Based solely on 
the findings of the limited record below, however, the Ninth 
Circuit found no error and upheld the trial court’s finding of 
 
171 Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 621 (C.D. Cal. 1996).  
Panavision was decided in the same court that is considering Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios. 
172 Kazaa’s financial success, attained despite spending virtually nothing on its content, 
will make its battle extremely difficult.  It earned millions in 2002 from U.S. advertisers 
such as Netflix and DirecTV. See Woody, supra note 145, at 106. 
173 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003). 
174 See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 621. 
175 See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1020–24 (9th Cir. 2001). 
176 See id. at 1021. 
177 Id. at 1020 (citation omitted). 
178 See id. at 1021. 
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knowledge.179  The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning is very important 
when considering the new peer-to-peer services’ liability, as it has 
already recognized that these services are “capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses.”180  When a trial 
court reviews a similar case in the future, it may be obligated to 
use the Ninth Circuit’s finding in its analysis, potentially allowing 
new peer-to-peer services in the post-Napster world to hide from 
liability under the Sony umbrella. 
The Ninth Circuit found that Napster’s failure to remove 
infringing works after having received specific notice from 
copyright holders satisfied the knowledge requirement for 
contributory liability.181  Applying the rationale from Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,182 
the Ninth Circuit agreed that “if a computer system operator learns 
of specific infringing material and fails to purge such material from 
the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct 
infringement.”183  The court also noted, however, that, 
absent any specific information which identifies infringing 
activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for 
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the 
system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.  To enjoin 
simply because a computer network allows for infringing use 
would, in our opinion, violate Sony and potentially restrict activity 
unrelated to infringing use.184 
The court concluded that the record from the trial court 
supported a finding of actual knowledge of specific infringing 
material on its system.185  The court, thus, found that Napster was 
contributorily liable because Napster was aware of the infringing 
material and possessed the capability to block access, but failed to 
do so.186 
 
179 See id. at 1021–22.  The record below did not consider potential uses of the program. 
See id. at 1021. 
180 Id. at 1021. 
181 See id. at 1022. 
182 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
183 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021. 
184 Id. (citation omitted). 
185 See id. at 1022. 
186 See id. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of contributory liability provides 
guidance for peer-to-peer services that are capable of blocking 
access and removing infringing material, but the new breed of 
distributed networks cannot follow suit.  If a finding of 
contributory liability depends solely on notice of infringing 
material,187 then programs like Kazaa and Gnutella would be 
liable.  If such liability rests on the ability to block and remove 
infringing material,188 however, the distributed network services 
would escape liability.  Unfortunately, the Napster II decision 
provides little guidance on what precisely triggers contributory 
liability; it is, therefore, difficult to predict how a court would rule 
on a case involving a distributed network. 
Vicarious liability applies when the defendant “has the right 
and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct 
financial interest in such activities.”189  The Ninth Circuit in 
Napster II held that financial benefit is present “where the 
availability of infringing material acts as a ‘draw’ for 
customers.”190  Although Napster had virtually no outside income 
at the time, its future income would have presumably been 
dependent on the number of users that its free service would 
attract.191  Kazaa is a perfect example of this; its large user base 
has allowed it to  accrue actual and substantial revenue from 
advertisers.192 
Despite a finding of financial benefit, the post-Napster peer-to-
peer services might escape vicarious liability on the prong of 
supervision.  The Ninth Circuit’s standard for such liability rested 
on the principle that “[t]he ability to block infringers’ access to a 
particular environment for any reason whatsoever is evidence of 
the right and ability to supervise.”193  While the court held that 
Napster was able to police its system by finding infringing material 
on its search indexes and terminating users’ access to the 
 
187 See id. at 1020–22. 
188 See id. 
189 Id. at 1022 (quotations omitted). 
190 Id. 
191 See id. 
192 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
193 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023. 
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system,194 the new peer-to-peer services are differently situated.  
Due to their distributed networks and no server through which 
requests must pass, it is unlikely that they would be able to find the 
infringing works195 or terminate users’ use of the program.196  In a 
case involving a new peer-to-peer system, therefore, courts would 
likely determine that there is insufficient supervision to hold the 
company vicariously liable. 
Each program may give rise to different facts.  For example, it 
is very likely that the record industry will not sue Gnutella, not 
only because of the potential legal challenges, but particularly 
because one of the five major record companies is responsible for 
its creation.197  The other possibility is to sue the users of the 
program, but they are extremely difficult to track, and the costs of 
litigation would likely exceed the award that would be recovered 
from the average user.198  Finally, unlike Kazaa, Gnutella obtains 
no financial benefit from users’ distribution and usage of the 
program, and this lack of present or future financial benefit could 
absolve Gnutella from vicarious liability.199 
3. Copyright Holders’ Out-of-Court Tactics 
While the courts and legislatures ruminate over what to do 
about the problems posed by the new peer-to-peer services that 
have no central server to shut down, copyright holders have sought 
solutions other than suing the services.  For example, in early 
2001, Belgian police raided the residences of Internet users for 
violations of copyright law, after a music industry organization 
claimed it was able to track users’ heavy downloading of 
 
194 See id. at 1024. 
195 See Mann, supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
196 See Wolk, supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
197 Justin Frankel and Tom Pepper of Nullsoft, a subsidiary of America Online [AOL], 
developed the Gnutella program in a form that could defeat the attempts of network 
administrators to block it; many administrators had successfully blocked Napster from 
their networks. See Giovanna Fessenden, Peer-to-Peer Technology: Analysis of 
Contributory Infringement and Fair Use, 42 J.L. & TECH. 391 (2002).  Two days after 
Gnutella was released on the Internet in June 2000, AOL, recognizing that the program 
could damage its newly-purchased record label, Time Warner Music Group, ended the 
project and stopped access to the program. See id. 
198 See id. 
199 See id.; see also Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023. 
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copyrighted files.200  Tactics on this side of the Atlantic have been 
even more intense.  Some of the major record companies have 
hired technology firms to spy on networks to identify large-scale 
infringers, “spoof”201 MP3s,202 or use interdiction.203  Legislation 
to legalize interdiction and other similar forms of attack is 
currently before Congress.204 
Record companies themselves have developed some attempts 
at solving the problem. One method that may prove to be 
successful is watermarking, which allows tracking of song copies 
around the world.205  Other solutions have not had so much luck: 
copy protection on CDs turned out to be expensive and possibly 
unconstitutional, while causing many users’ computers to crash.206  
Another scheme, Sony’s Key2Audio copy protection, could be 
easily eliminated by using a felt-tip pen, and hackers could easily 
figure out how to crack the protection software codes.207 
Copy protection also created opposition in other nations.  In 
Australia, after hearing about Universal’s plan to release copy-
protected CDs, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission told manufacturers to put labels on CDs to warn 
consumers that the protected CDs might not play in CD-ROM 
drives.208  In Europe, Sony released millions of its copy-protected 
 
200 See J. Jeffrey Landen, Beyond Napster: An Enforcement Crisis in Copyright Law?, 
28 N. KY. L. REV. 713, 717–18 (2001). 
201 “Spoofing” involves creating media files that are disguised as popular songs.  When 
someone downloads the spoofed file, he or she finds that it is some other track, often a 
repetitious—and annoying—loop of part of the song’s chorus. 
202 “MP3 (MPEG-1 Audio Layer-3) is a standard technology and format for 
compression a sound sequence into a very small file (about one-twelfth the size of the 
original file) while preserving the original level of sound quality when it is played.” MP3, 
Whatis.com, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci212600,00.html (last 
updated July 27, 2001). 
203 Use interdiction involves flooding a user with a large harbor of copyrighted material 
and sending that user so many requests that other users cannot get their requests through. 
See Jeff Howe, Under Cover, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 97. 
204 See id. 
205 See Jeff Howe, Dirty Dozen, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 98.  Watermarking entails 
“[d]igitally stamping each track on an advance CD so you can hunt down and punish 
whoever uploads it to the world.” Id. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See Bergen, supra note 149, at 274. 
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CDs with the warning that the CD should not be played in either 
PC or Macintosh CD drives because the Key2Audio protection 
software would cause the computers to crash.209  In April 2002, 
Warner Music Japan began testing protection on CDs that would 
also contain warnings, but this kind would prevent the copying of 
songs onto users’ computers.210 
Despite these obstacles, where countries follow a strict 
DMCA-like law, copyright holders have been encouraged to 
develop technological measures.  This is because under a DMCA-
like regime, the plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that a person 
who makes a copy used a tool to circumvent the protection to 
prove infringement.  The defense of fair use is thus not available.  
In countries that favor fair use, however, these technological 
measures might run counter to long-established laws that permit 
owners of a work to make a copy for their own personal use. 
Finally, in addition to suing creators of file-sharing programs, 
the record industry has begun to consider suing individuals that 
offer large quantities of songs on their hard drives.211  The 
companies have been a little cautious about using this approach, 
however, because of the potential backlash from consumers.212  In 
addition, companies like AOL Time Warner had been hesitant to 
take this route because it could mean suing AOL Internet users, 
which in turn would mean forcing the ISP to track down and reveal 
the name of the users.213 
A recent case, however, cleared some hurdles for those 
pursuing individual cyber infringers of copyrights.  In In re 
Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,214 the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA)215 sought to enforce a subpoena 
served on Verizon, an ISP, to learn the identity of a Verizon user 
 
209 See id. 
210 See id. at 275. 
211 See Anna W. Mathews & Bruce Orwall, Industry to Sue People Abetting Net Song 
Swaps, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002, at B1. 
212 See id. at B3 
213 See id. 
214 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). 
215 The RIAA represents most, but not all, owners of copyrights in sound recordings. 
See Richard D. Rose, Connecting the Dots, 42 J.L. & Tech. 313 (2002). 
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who downloaded over 600 songs in a single day.216  The court held 
that “the subpoena power in 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) applies to all 
Internet service providers within the scope of the DMCA, not just 
to those service providers storing information on a system or 
network at the direction of the user.”217  Therefore, compliance 
with section 512(h) is a prerequisite for an ISP to receive section 
512’s insulation from liability for contributory or vicarious 
copyright infringement.218  This requirement applies whether or 
not “infringed material is stored or controlled on the [ISP’s] system 
or network.219  The court was particularly concerned about the 
loophole it would create if all ISPs were not included under the 
subpoena power.220  ISPs are very concerned that “bots,” a 
program that can search the Internet for infringement, will flood 
ISPs with countless automatically-generated subpoenas.221  
Although bots did not exist when the DMCA was passed in 1998, 
the court deferred to Congress to solve the bot problem.222  It will 
be difficult for the bot to figure out whether the detected use is 
considered fair use or not, and with the ability of “ghosting,” or 
disguising an Internet protocol address as a different one, “[t]he 
chance for error is very high, and the risk to privacy is very high as 
 
216 Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
217 Id.  Section 512(h) provides: 
Request. A copyright owner or a person authorized to act on the owner’s 
behalf may request the clerk of any United States district court to issue a 
subpoena to a service provider for identification of an alleged infringer in 
accordance with this subsection. 
. . . 
Actions of service provider receiving subpoena. Upon receipt of the issued 
subpoena . . . the service provider shall expeditiously disclose to the copyright 
owner or person authorized by the copyright owner the information required by 
the subpoena, notwithstanding any other provision of law and regardless of 
whether the service provider responds to the notification. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(1), (5) (2000). 
218 See Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 26 
219 Id. at 29. 
220 See id. at 35 (finding that “under Verizon’s reading of the [DMCA], a significant 
amount of potential copyright infringement would be shielded from the subpoena 
authority of the DMCA”). 
221 See id. at 38. 
222 See id. at 39. 
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well.”223  With the possibility of accusations that are not reviewed 
by a legal body, the error can lead to revelations of private 
information, even when the person whose information is turned 
over to the RIAA turns out to be innocent of the charges.224  Thus, 
the ire the music industry is already facing from “waging war” 
against file-sharers may spread to ISPs in the United States and 
any other countries that follow a similar legal interpretation.225 
III. BALANCING LAW AND POLICY TO CREATE PROPER 
SOLUTIONS 
A. Rethinking Copyright 
Some argue that like Betamax, the Internet will fail to 
eliminate the creativity that copyright was designed to foster.  
Although many courts have not allowed the argument that 
infringing use may actually increase sales,226 it may be worthwhile 
if courts instead consider whether they are basing their opinions on 
an outdated doctrine.  The new forms of artistic and literary 
distribution that now exist via the Internet have exposed the true 
beneficiaries of copyright law and raised questions as to whether 
copyright is workable or even desirable in the digital age. 
The typical argument that the record industry has been using is 
that if artists cannot get paid, there will be no good music out 
there, despite that the industry has demonstrated for years “that 
 
223 Simon Glickman, Judge Orders Verizon to Give Up Mega-Swapper: It’s Privacy vs. 
Piracy as RIAA Wins Round in District Court—But Are Rights-Holders Downloading 
More Trouble?, Hits Daily Double, at http://www.hitsdailydouble.com/news/ 
newsPage.cgi?news04056m01 (Jan. 21, 2003). 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See Einhorn, supra note 153, at 452; cf. also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 453 n.38 (1984). 
Today, the larger the audience for the original telecast, the higher the price 
plaintiffs [the copyright owners] can demand from broadcasters from rerun 
rights.  There is no survey within the knowledge of this court to show that the 
rerun audience is comprised of persons who have not seen the program.  In any 
event, if ratings can reflect Betamax recording, original audiences may increase 
and, given market practices, this should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them. 
Id. 
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when musicians are not fairly paid, they continue to play, write 
songs, perform at concerts, and cut records.”227  In addition, 
relatively few artists have spoken out against digital downloading; 
some have even encouraged it.228  Rock singer Courtney Love has 
repeatedly expressed her frustration with the industry, saying that 
she will “allow millions of people to get [her] music for nothing if 
they want and hopefully they’ll be kind enough to leave a tip if 
they like it.”229  The sentiment among artists today is reminiscent 
of that of the successful band The Grateful Dead, who encouraged 
fans to tape its live performances.230  The few artists that have 
spoken out against downloading include pop star Britney Spears, 
who is ironically a singer of, at best, questionable creativity.231 
Indeed, it might be time to ask whether we need copyright at 
all if “Science and useful Arts”232 are already, and have always 
been, progressing.  Before the Statute of Anne,233 the world’s first 
modern copyright law, was passed in 1710, “Sophocles, Dante, da 
Vinci, Botticelli, Michaelangelo, Shakespeare, Newton, Cervantes, 
[and] Bach . . . all found reasons to get out of bed in the morning 
without expecting to own the works they created.”234  Today, 
mp3.com contains music from thousands of artists who make it 
available on the site for free;235 scholarly articles, short stories, and 
poetry are ubiquitous on the web; and hundreds of grandmothers 
have learned to use the Internet so they can post recipes online.  
For all these people who have been a part of the progression of 
literature and the arts, strict copyright control is in the back of their 
minds, far behind the human urge to create. 
It may also be time to consider the positive economic effects of 
new technology that can develop when copyright law is not 
enforced on strict terms.  Even though virtually everyone owns a 
 
227 LITMAN, supra note 71, at 168. 
228 See Mathews & Orwall, supra note 207. 
229 Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, Salon.com, at http://www.salon.com/ 
tech/feature/2000/06/14/love (June 14, 2000). 
230 See John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 240. 
231 See Howe, supra note 205. 
232 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
233 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
234 See Barlow, supra note 230. 
235 See http://www.mp3.com. 
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VCR, revenues from movies are higher than ever, and the film 
industry has become dependent on videotape sales and rentals for 
half of its income.236  From 1998 to 2000, the first two years that 
MP3s were available on the Internet, CD sales rose by twenty 
percent.237  In addition, concert ticket sales earned a record $2.1 
billion in economically-depressed 2002, which was also the fourth 
straight year that concert receipts hit record totals.238  The 
marketing abilities of the Internet may have caused more people 
with less disposable income to shell out money for these acts, just 
like the bootlegged tapes of Grateful Dead shows did in the late 
1960s.239 
Instead of viewing CDs as the main product, the new post-
copyright world may use music as promotional material to sell 
concert tickets, t-shirts, special-edition movies and print material, 
as well as the occasional CD.  Also, just like with waiters, even if 
there is no legal obligation to tip an artist, fans who download 
music might leave some money on the table because “it’s the right 
thing to do.”240  The tip might not be $16.98 per album, but 
without the costs of packaging and distribution, the artists that only 
create because they get paid might end up keeping a greater share 
of the money for themselves than they would have if a CD had 
sold in a store anyway.241  The group that would lose the most in a 
post-copyright world would be the record and distribution 
executives, who, through the RIAA, were recently found to be 
 
236 See Barlow, supra note 230. 
237 See id. 
238 See 2002 Year End Business Analysis, Poll Star Online, at 
http://www.pollstaronline.com/sf-ye2002-biz.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2003). 
239 See Barlow, supra note 230 (noting that “the tapes [became] a marketing virus that 
would spawn enough Deadheads to fill any stadium in America”). 
240 Id. at 252. 
241 One group that has spoken out more vehemently against free digital downloading 
than most is Metallica, a band that in a 1996 lawsuit against its record label, Elektra 
Entertainment, gave itself the party name “We’re Only in It for the Music.” See We’re 
Only in It for the Music v. Elektra Entertainment, No. 9644007 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1996).  In 
the battle involving Napster, Metallica changed its priorities; the band sued not only 
Napster, but also several universities that provided Internet access to students. See John 
Borland, Napster, Universities Sued by Metallica, News.com, at http://news.com.com/ 
2100-1023-239263.html (Apr. 13, 2000). 
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responsible for overcharging consumers by $500 million.242  Thus, 
it is doubtful that the music industry would get any sympathy from 
lawmakers that it does not buy,243 and it is questionable whether 
the music industry would survive in a post-copyright world.  The 
death of the industry would not necessarily equate to the death of 
creativity, however, and a new, more efficient industry may even 
rise out of the ashes until the next technological bombshell comes 
around. 
B. Striking a Balance in the Copyright Bargain 
It is highly unlikely that the world will make such a paradigm 
shift that copyright will be eliminated in its entirety.  The DMCA, 
EU Directives, and Napster holdings, however, are ineffective, 
inapplicable to the current state of technology, and virtually 
obsolete.  In addition, the current method of litigation has turned 
copyright holders into kids at a carnival who seem to believe they 
can win at this game of whack-a-mole.  Therefore, a new approach 
must be found, with the ultimate solution containing legal, 
business, and technological elements; no one element will be able 
to solve the problem.244 
New and shifting differences in legal standards can create 
confusion among both copyright holders and users, especially 
when the overwhelming majority of the public does not understand 
the subtle nuances that can exist in copyright legislation.245  This 
could lead to difficult and extensive legal problems now that 
copyright holders can identify and sue the direct infringers who are 
using peer-to-peer services.246  We have already seen ample 
 
242 See Jake Chessum, David Boies: The Wired Interview, WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 258.  A 
settlement has just been reached that provides a cash payment of $67.4 million and $75.7 
million in CDs to the public. See CD MAP Settlement, at 
http://www.musiccdsettlement.com (last visited Jan. 19, 2003). 
243 The industry does pay, however; the RIAA contributed $124,000 to both parties in 
2002. See Howe, supra note 205. 
244 See Julia Hanna, Peer-to-Peer: Has the Music Stopped?, Harv. Bus. Sch. Working 
Knowledge, at http://hbsworkingknowledge.hbs.edu/pubitem.jhtml (Feb. 11, 2003) 
(“‘Legal action should not be the only tool in the game.’ . . .  ‘There are always 
loopholes, and legal actions take a long time to work their way through the courts.’” 
(quoting Tsvi Gal, CIO of Warner Music Group)). 
245 See Bergen, supra note 149, at 272. 
246 See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). 
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evidence that the public does not believe it is doing something 
morally or legally wrong when it downloads copyrighted works.247  
Those versed in copyright terminology call downloading a file for 
personal use “fair use,” while others believe that so long as they 
are not selling the works they are sharing online, they are not 
criminals.248  Under the No Electronic Theft Act (herinafter “NET 
Act”), however, a person who infringes copyrights in excess of 
$1,000 in retail value within a 180-day period is a criminal and 
may be imprisoned for up to ten years.249  Even if the government 
and the entertainment industries begin to enforce the NET Act 
against the public, the amount of people downloading enough 
material to meet $1,000 will be very small.250  In addition, the 
violators will be difficult to identify without strong involvement 
from ISPs, and the entertainment companies might enrage the 
public to the point that the public boycotts products from 
companies that enforce the NET Act.251 
In the history of copyright, several goals for copyright have 
come up in legislatures and courts.252  These goals include 
balancing copyright against the advancement of technology and 
protection of the public’s rights to access the works, protect their 
privacy, and express themselves freely.253  In the digital age, 
however, U.S. and EU legislatures and courts have ignored these 
historically important and fundamental goals.254  In regard to 
technological advancement, what lawmakers should do is rewrite 
the rules so that new parties have a chance to invest in and develop 
the new media and technologies.255 
 
247 See Landen, supra note 200, at 714. 
248 Id. 
249 See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000). 
250 See Fessenden, supra note 197. 
251 See id. 
252 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
253 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985). 
254 See supra Part II.C (describing how Napster I and Verizon have given less 
importance to fair use and privacy in favor of controlling infringement). 
255 See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 173. 
History tells us that [entrepreneurs] do invest without paying attention to 
conventional wisdom. . . .  Apparently, many entrepreneurs conclude that if 
something is valuable, a way will be found to charge for it, so they concentrate 
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While the DMCA prevents any circumvention of copyright 
protection, it would be advantageous to the progress of technology 
to allow reverse engineers, analysts, critics, and even derivative 
users to make fair use of many works available online.256  Value 
has been created in the past even when the underlying product is 
offered for free.  For example, broadcasters realized that they could 
earn money through advertising, while AOL achieved market 
dominance by giving away software.257  Also, “industry observers 
agree that at least half of all of the copies of software out there are 
unauthorized, yet the software market is booming . . . .”258  These 
facts suggest that the DMCA and the Copyright Directive may 
stifle scientific and technological creativity that society has 
historically tried to nurture. 
When writing the new rules, one must consider not only the 
technology industries, but the group that has been left out of the 
bargaining process the most—the public.  Congress described 
copyright’s purpose as “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts,”259 and it is therefore logical to conclude that “the 
public is entitled to expect access to the works that copyright 
inspires. . . .  For much of this country’s history, public 
dissemination was, except in very limited circumstances, a 
condition of copyright protection.”260  This intent can be seen 
everywhere from the existence and protection of fair use in the 
copyright law to the expenditure of millions of dollars every year 
in the maintenance and operation of museums across the 
country.261 
Indeed, when the Supreme Court handed down the Sony 
decision, it ensured that its ruling would strongly emphasize the 
public interest.262  Past and present lawsuits involving Internet 
 
on getting market share first, and worry about profits—and the rules for making 
them—later. 
Id. 
256 See Scully, supra note 151, at 322. 
257 See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 174. 
258 Id. 
259 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
260 LITMAN, supra note 71, at 175. 
261 See id. at 176. 
262 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
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downloading have failed to give the public interest such 
importance, and current negotiations within the industry have left 
out the public entirely.263  As the Supreme Court has emphasized, 
however, “this task involves a difficult balance between the 
interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of 
their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s 
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and 
commerce on the other hand.”264  When it comes to forming laws 
to fit the digital age, courts and legislatures must keep this balance 
in the forefront before making hasty changes to the copyright laws 
that could eliminate the public’s fair use rights. 
In 1790, Congress limited copyright owners’ rights to the 
printing, publishing, and sale of copyrighted works, with the owner 
having no right to restrict public performances, adaptations, 
 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor 
primarily designed to provide a special benefit.  Rather, the limited grant is a 
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a 
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius 
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. 
“The copyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.” . . .  “‘The sole interest of the United States and the primary 
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the 
public from the labors of authors.’” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (quoting 
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))). 
263 For example, the RIAA and the Business Software Alliance agreed that if the 
technology leaders oppose Congress’s efforts to broaden consumer rights, the RIAA will 
oppose any legislation that requires developers of technological devices to build in 
controls that block users’ ability to copy files. See Mike Darrah, Entertainment & 
Technology Leaders Agree on Compromise?, Winamp.com, at http://www.winamp.com/ 
news.jhtml?articleid=9800http://www.winamp.com/news.jhtml (Jan. 15, 2003). 
264 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.  The Supreme Court has actually suggested that the public 
comes first: 
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, 
music, and the other arts.  The immediate effect of our copyright law is to 
secure a fair return for an “author’s” creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by 
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.  “The 
sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the 
monopoly,” this Court has said, “lie in the general benefits derived by the 
public from the labors of authors.” 
Id. at 431–32 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 
(1975)). 
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translations, or displays of the work.265  Over time, however, 
Congress added more rights to the bundle and “did not incorporate 
specific exemptions for the general population in most of these 
enactments because nobody showed up to ask for them.”266  
Despite the broadening of rights, it was not until the enactment of 
the DMCA that Congress gave copyright owners control over the 
public’s ability to “look[] at, listen[] to, learn[] from or us[e] 
copyrighted works.”267  The difficulty lies in distinguishing copies 
that are a form of piracy from incidental copies made while 
listening to, viewing, or improving works on digital media.268  In 
both cases, copies are made, but both creators and the public lose 
out when the DMCA and Copyright Directive ban incidental 
copies in an effort to stop piracy.269 
In addition to considering the historically important copyright 
goals, one should also examine the public’s perspectives, beliefs, 
and expectations about how copyright works when copyright law 
is revised to fit the new digital age.  For example, instead of 
focusing on the number of “copies” made, the law could make a 
distinction between “commercial” and “noncommercial” uses.  
While this is a very different way of looking at copyright overall, 
the commercial/noncommercial distinction already appears in 
statutes and case law regarding fair use and vicarious liability.270  
If a copyright owner can argue that another person’s use of the 
work would violate the owner’s right to exploit the work to the 
extent that a lawsuit could be brought against the user, then such a 
use could be considered a violation of copyright law, while a 
person’s sharing of a file over the Internet with a friend would not 
be.271  While this test is quite blurry, delineating boundaries 
between fair and unfair use has never been easy or clear. “The task 
is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for [17 U.S.C. § 107], 
 
265 See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 175–76. 
266 Id. at 176. 
267 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
268 See id. at 178. 
269 See id. 
270 See supra Part II.B., C. 
271 See LITMAN, supra note 71, at 181.  The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 already 
tacitly allows such sharing of nondigital music recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000). 
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like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.”272  
If we allow judges and jurors to work with the test, and 
programmers to design new products that would fit the test, 
however, the lines may become much brighter, more predictable, 
and more in line with the true goals of copyright law.  
Furthermore, returning the focus to the value of noninfringing uses 
would increase the dissemination of works to the public and 
promote technology for advancing the progress of science and the 
arts. 
In addition, a new legal solution might promote more 
appropriate technological solutions that would not run afoul of 
constitutional protections.273  For example, a company called 
Altnet has developed a system in which users pay a small fee to 
reliably download music of better quality than that which exists on 
most peer-to-peer systems.274  Such a system would combine the 
convenience of peer-to-peer services and the quality of authentic 
CDs with a middle-of-the-road price—a combination that could 
solve the problem of getting the public to pay authors for 
copyrighted material while ensuring that the public right to access 
the material is not destroyed.275  Until technology can distinguish 
between actionable infringement and fair use online, and between 
copyrighted material and works in the public domain on the 
Internet, lawmakers and courts should err on the side of protecting 
the public if they want to uphold the fundamental goals of 
copyright.276 
C. Harmonizing the New Laws 
Perhaps one of the most important legal lessons that has come 
out of all this legislation and litigation is that we are not very close 
to global harmonization of copyright standards.  Once the parties 
 
272 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
273 See Declan McCullagh, Another Punch for Copy Protection, Wired News, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51400,00.html (Mar. 28, 2002) (discussing 
Congressional involvement in copyright holders’ efforts to create mandatory copy 
protection). 
274 See Hanna, supra note 244. 
275 See id. 
276 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
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involved in reforming copyright law finally decide what the law 
should be, however, it is of utmost importance to ensure that the 
law is enforced across the board.  This emphasis on harmonization 
is nothing new; one of the primary goals of the 1886 Berne 
Convention was to harmonize copyright law.277  TRIPS and the 
WIPO treaties also aimed to harmonize copyright law.278  This 
historical emphasis on the harmonization of copyright law should 
be a fundamental basis for implementing new laws on a global 
scale. 
If laws on digital infringement for current and future peer-to-
peer services are to be truly harmonized, they must set forth a 
workable and more predictable standard for analyzing the claims 
that are brought into the courts, both in the United States and in the 
European Union.  If participating governments want laws and 
verdicts harmonized, legislatures and courts will have to square 
Sony and RealNetworks with Napster II to create a harmonious test 
for vicarious and contributory infringement.  In addition, owners of 
copyrights in sound recordings would be wise to create some form 
of technological security measure to affix to the recordings.  Such 
measures would assure the owners a better chance at succeeding in 
a suit under section 1201 of the DMCA or article 6 of the 
Copyright Directive. 
Practical reasons for harmonizing copyright law also exist.  For 
example, if the Kazaa and Sony decisions are not resolved with 
Napster II, creators and the public will likely take the safest paths 
in publication and use to protect themselves from infringement and 
liability respectively. A company such as AOL may uniformly 
restrict its users’ access, even though it is insulated from liability in 
the United States, based on the German court’s ruling that AOL 
was liable for allowing people to share copyrighted material on its 
service.279  It would be unwise as a matter of policy to let the edge 
 
277 See Berne Convention, supra note 48.  One of Berne’s goals was to “protect, in as 
effective and uniform manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic 
works.” Id. (emphasis added). 
278 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 54; WCT, supra note 6, pmbl.; WPPT, supra note 
6, pmbl. 
279 See Jacobus, supra note 113. 
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of this chilling effect replace the boundaries that countries have 
developed through the legislatures and the courts. 
Alternatively, true global harmonization, to the extent it can be 
accomplished, can help to crack down on certain parties involved 
in infringement, particularly those with whom copyright holders 
are the most concerned.  For example, international harmonization 
may allow a country like the United States to fine a programmer 
acting outside the United States, even though it is impractical to 
arrest every user of a program once the program is out on the 
Internet.280  Also, ISPs who are concerned about losing customers 
in the wake of the Verizon decision will rest easier if most ISPs 
around the world follow the same rules.281  Those copyright 
holders who wish to collect damages would have a much easier 
time if more countries enforced a uniform legal standard, and more 
courts would be able to obtain jurisdiction over more parties.282  
Finally, harmonized laws will be easier for the public to learn, 
understand, and use. 
If one state breaks an international agreement, however, that 
divergence threatens the purposes behind harmonization of the 
copyright laws, as well as the copyright laws’ legitimacy.  For 
example, after the Amsterdam Kazaa ruling, a programmer who 
designs a new kind of file-sharing software can do his work from 
the Netherlands, or from any other country that is not part of an 
international copyright agreement.  Even if that programmer were 
subject to another court’s jurisdiction, the remedies would be 
difficult to enforce in the programmer’s home country.  Therefore, 
because there is no evidence that harmonization treaties will bind 
every nation to a single copyright law and assure that the law will 
be enforced, the question arises as to whether the measures that the 
United States and European Union have taken are effective and 
 
280 See King, supra note 5. 
281 See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003); Michelle 
Delio, DMCA: Dow What It Wants to Do, Wired News, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,57011,00.html (Dec. 31, 2002) (describing 
how a user of an American ISP, when his service was severed after the ISP received a 
complaint that the user was violating the DMCA by posting a parody site, has begun to 
consider contracting his new service from European ISPs that have not yet implemented 
the Copyright Directive). 
282 See King, supra note 5. 
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sufficient to protect those who hold the rights to digital sound 
recordings.  Thus far, the rampant piracy on the Internet suggests 
that the current measures are ineffective and insufficient. 
Revisions of current digital copyright law cannot come too 
soon.  The United States faces a threat to the measures already 
imposed under the DMCA; courts have been hearing arguments 
that the DMCA violates due process, fair use, and First 
Amendment protections; and new bills have been introduced in the 
House of Representatives that try to address the over-inclusiveness 
of the DMCA.283  If the DMCA is rewritten, the European Union, 
in the interest of harmonization, would probably have to follow 
suit by revising the Copyright Directive. Otherwise, U.S. citizens 
could be sued in another country for a use that is considered fair in 
the United States, thus potentially dismantling WIPO’s ideals in 
encouraging member states to agree to its treaties in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Napster II set a precedent not only for the United States, but 
for the European Union as well, because the Copyright Directive is 
very similar to the DMCA.  Napster II thus provided a valuable 
interpretation of both the DMCA and the Copyright Directive, if 
the latter is even enacted in the member states.284  Legal solutions 
concerning the Internet, however, become obsolete before the 
courts’ opinions even reach the clerk’s office.  All of the laws, 
treaties, and agreements, while perhaps effective in theory, are 
based on national borders and international treaties and can thus 
never cover the proliferation of violations that exist in the global 
and transnational reality of the Internet.285  There will always be at 
least one country that will neither accept nor enforce whatever 
 
283 For example, Rep. Rick Boucher (D-VA) and Rep. John Doolittle (R-CA) 
reintroduced the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act. See Digital Media Consumers’ 
Rights Act, H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003).  The bill eliminates liability for creating or 
using anti-circumvention technologies if the subsequent use of the obtained copyrighted 
work is either not infringement or has substantial noninfringing uses. See id.  Liability 
would also be eliminated when anti-circumvention involves scientific research. See id. 
284 See Bergen, supra note 149, at 270. 
285 See Scully, supra note 151, at 320. 
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legal solutions most of the world deems proper.286  Therefore, 
communities of file-sharing will probably always exist, although 
there are disagreements as to how large and numerous they will be. 
Despite this fact, time may prove that downloading may not be 
such a rampant problem at all; the effects of peer-to-peer services 
should be fully evaluated before technological development and 
the public’s rights are legislated into oblivion.  While “effect on 
the market”287 has been an oft-stated reason for shutting down 
services that allow users to download copyrighted material from 
the Internet, recent research suggests that the cited effects might be 
weapons in defendants’ hands.  For example, a Forrester Research 
study found that “piracy is not responsible for the 15 percent drop 
in music sales in the past two years” and “labels can restore 
industry growth by making it easier for people to find, copy, and 
pay for music on their own terms.  By 2007, digital music revenues 
will reach more than $2 billion.”288  The New York Times reported 
that “people who use file-sharing networks to obtain music at no 
charge over the Internet are more likely to have increased their 
spending on music than are average online music fans.”289  These 
studies show strong financial and public benefits are to be gained 
from the very thing that the DMCA and Copyright Directive are 
trying to stamp out. 
Perhaps the most likely scenario is that while the courts, 
legislatures, and copyright holders are trying to find a solution, the 
market will work it out.  When music industry profits declined 
twenty years ago, record labels launched a “home taping is killing 
music” campaign.290  In 1942, after the introduction of phonograph 
records, the American Federation of Musicians claimed that 
musicians who performed for the records were “playing for their 
own funerals.”291  Somehow, however, the music industry evolved 
 
286 See id. 
287 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
288 See Press Release, Forrester Research, Downloads Did Not Cause the Music Slump, 
But They Can Cure It (Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.forrester.com/ER/Press/ 
Release/0,1769,741,00.html. 
289 Matt Richel, Access to Free Online Music Is Seen as a Boost to Sales, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 6, 2002, at C6. 
290 See Wolk, supra note 90. 
291 Id. 
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instead of falling apart; some executives today even believe that 
file-sharing is good for business, as it gets their product 
“advertised.”292  The best and most likely outcome of the whole 
Internet copyright debacle is that the entertainment industry will 
adapt to efficiently give the public what it wants and is willing to 
pay for—fresher material, sharper quality, better packaging, and a 
desire to own a physical collection of creative works. 
 
 
292 Id. 
